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The Welfare State and New Challenge From the Back Door 
ABSTRACT 
The empirical study of the organisational changes of the State of welfare since the 
1980s in Germany, Britain, France and Italy suggests a convergent and consistent proc-
ess of homogenisation driven chiefly by institutional mimetic isomorphism. This new 
‘organisational settlement’ is increasingly shaped by the structural autonomisation of 
individual service delivery units. This paper argues that, when organisational autonomy 
becomes normatively sanctioned, that this increases the likelihood of its adoption, even 
in the face of different institutional conditions and welfare regimes. Hence, the paper is 
foremost concerned with explaining similarities and decreasing variance across coun-
tries and across sectors, and with accounting for the main driver of this homogenisation 
process. Why would different organisational fields across countries and welfare regimes 
adopt similar structures, in light of inconclusive evidence of economic efficiency gains? 
The convergence of the organisational settlement of the welfare delivery state is not 
only driven by economic globalisation or efficiency linked to performance, but primar-
ily by the political demand to find new sources of legitimation in an age of increasing 
displacement of political authority to managers. The paper is structured in three main 
parts. First, it revisits the theory of organisational isomorphism by its application to the 
new patterns of change of welfare delivery. Secondly, it discusses the reform trajecto-
ries of autonomisation in schooling and hospital care in Britain, in comparative terms 
with France and Italy. Thirdly, it concentrates on Germany and it establishes empiri-
cally how this case does no longer fit the characterisation of ‘immobilisme’, especially 
in the health care sector. Lastly, the wider implications of organisational homogenisa-
tion for the TRUDI constellation are discussed.  
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The Welfare State and New Challenge From the Back Door 
INTRODUCTION 
‘Organising’ welfare influences the formation of preferences, norms and opinions and, 
thus, the institutional framework for future welfare activity. The welfare state has been 
frequently assessed in terms of the amount of benefits and the politics of redistribution, 
and less often in terms of its importance in the transformations of modern democratic 
institutions, including bureaucratic organisations. In this paper the conventional rank-
ings of welfare states by macroeconomic indicators take less relevance, and more em-
phasis is placed on the process of organisational adaptation leading to the homogenisa-
tion of ‘organisational fields’ (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983)1 pertaining to the welfare 
state. The main purpose of this paper is to explain homogeneity of organisational forms 
and practices across countries. Homogenisation refers to the process of narrowing the 
variance between organisations, as similar innovations and changes are adopted across 
different environmental conditions and over time. Organisational change affects the 
structure, processes and behaviour of actors. Here in this paper I am most interested in 
how organisations of welfare delivery are becoming more similar in their structure. This 
is the most visible indicator of a measurement of homogenisation. As Egeberg argues 
(Egeberg, 1999), organisational structure affects agenda setting, actors’ preferences and 
decision behaviour, and has a lasting impact on actors’ interests. Far from referring to 
legal rules, an organisational structure is a normative framework composed of rules and 
roles specifying who is expected to do what (Scott, 1981). The structure can never be 
neutral, it always represents a mobilisation of bias in preparation for action 
(Schattschneider, 1975: 30). 
Although organisational changes may be claimed to be only formal and legalistic, 
they are not inconsequential for the future transformations of the state and need greater 
attention. Furthermore, organisations matter in so far as they are independent institu-
tional actors, and not merely instrumental tools to pursue goals of equity and distribu-
tion. Taking the TRUDI constellation as the main analytical tool 2, the empirical inves-
                                                 
1 Sociological institutionalism in the late 1970s in the United States focuses less on such and such single organisa-
tion and more and more on population of organisations. Institutional sociologists like DiMaggio study what they 
define as organisational fields (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Such fields are formed by bodies ranging from pub-
lic institutions (hospitals, schools, etc) to professional activities (doctors, teachers). The field in which a public 
system is embedded is studied as a whole, as an activity making rules, supervising and surveying. It defines an in-
stitutional context within which each single organisation plots its courses of action.  
2 TRUDI is the acronym indicative of a conceptual mapping of the modern nation state as unfolding on four inter-
locking dimensions: the resource, the legal, the legitimacy and welfare dimension (Leibfried and Zürn, 2005). In 
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tigation of organisational changes of the welfare state in four European countries in the 
last fifteen years indicate a convergent process of homogenisation driven by institu-
tional isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983: 148). Adopting an organisational 
perspective this paper suggests that individual organisations of service delivery are in-
creasingly framed upon the ‘autonomous enterprise’ model in Germany, Britain, Italy 
and France. Organisational restructuring of delivery institutions is an observable phe-
nomenon particularly in those areas of the welfare state committed to the provision of 
education, including early years (Lewis, 2003), and health care. The empirical investi-
gation of the paper is limited to those New Public Management (NPM) reforms3 pertain-
ing to the introduction of general management and entrepreneurialism. Thus, it is be-
yond the scope of this paper to study such reforms as new auditing and budgeting sys-
tems, new costing instruments, etc. As far as the time horizon is concerned, the study 
will have a broad horizon as reforms were introduced in individual countries and sectors 
with considerable time lag. In Germany we witness a late adoption of managerialism, in 
comparative terms with other European countries (Wöllmann, 2001). Whereas in Britain 
general management was introduced in the NHS in 1983, comparable experimentations 
were introduced in German hospitals, for instance, only in the late 1990s. ‘General 
management’ refers to the radical change in the British NHS which resulted from the 
Griffiths Report of 1983. Notoriously, the report advocated replacing the pre-existing 
system of consensus decision-making with a single chief executive or general manager 
at the district health authority and unit levels of organisation (e.g. hospital). Griffith 
argued that clearer allocation of responsibilities to general managers was necessary and 
                                                                                                                                               
the 1960s and 70s, during the Golden Age of the welfare state, the four functions constitutive of the four dimen-
sions all merged at the nation state level, where the Territorial state, the Rule of Law, the Democratic state, and 
the Intervention state were combined in one. Within this conceptual framework, the organisational change is de-
fined on the ‘horizontal’ axis, and comprises shifts of the state capacity to act in terms of the public-private divide 
(Rothgang, Obinger, and Leibfried, 2006: 251).   
3 Hood defines NPM as ‘a shorthand name for the set of broadly similar administrative doctrines which dominated 
the bureaucratic reform agenda in many OECD group of countries from the late 1970s’ (1991). ‘Entrepreneurial 
state’ refers to the doctrinal component of NPM linked to emphasis on private-sector styles of management prac-
tice, exemplified by greater flexibility in hiring and rewards, discretionary control of organisations from ap-
pointed persons at the top ‘free to manage’ (Hood 1991). The prescriptions of NPM, as articulated in Reinventing 
Government by Osborne and Gaebler, (1992) include: the separation of the purchaser role of public services from 
the provider role; the growth of contractual or semi-contractual arrangements; accountability for performance; 
flexibility of pay and conditions; the separation of the political process from the management process; the crea-
tion of internal markets or quasi-markets; an emphasis on the public as customer; the reconsideration of the regu-
latory role of the state; and a change in the general intellectual climate. 
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valuable to improve the service. General management presumes that a clear and stable 
line can be drawn between ‘political’ and ‘management’ decisions. Much of this separa-
tion has entered the discourse of health care reforms and consists of fads (Marmor, 
2004). 
Findings suggest that diffusion processes across countries and organisational fields 
are characterised by institutional isomorphism. However, this convergence of the insti-
tutional design of complex organisations is not directly driven by globalisation or justi-
fication of efficiency gains, but rather by the need for organisational survival and le-
gitimacy. For such purpose, organisations endorse the models which are perceived to be 
most innovative or ‘modern’. The empirical link between autonomy and performance is 
inconclusive, which prompts scholars to use sociological concepts such as mimetic iso-
morphism. Why do so many organisations, whether public or private, adopt formal 
structures, procedures and symbols that are so identical? As Pollitt suggests conver-
gence is a ‘myth’ (Pollitt, 2001: 938). He argues that convergence in the sense of repli-
cation of rhetoric has to do with symbols rather than functional necessity for increased 
efficiency. As he points out, there is yet no available evidence that New Public Man-
agement has brought efficiency gains. Most of the studies that analyse the effects of 
autonomy on the performance of public organisation are inconclusive. Because of the 
theoretical background in economics, most studies focus on measurement of financial 
ratios, like return on investment, technical efficiency, or productivity as performance. 
Only very few studies focus on aspects of effectiveness, quality and accountability, and 
system coherence. Lack of data is reported by several studies (Pollitt et al, 1998).   
The transformations of the state, as discussed in this paper, pertain to the organisa-
tional structure of the state. The process of developing and transforming welfare states 
cannot be divorced from fundamental institutional questions about organisational struc-
tures. I argue that there is much to be gained by attending to the implications of organ-
isational isomorphism for social policy in those fields in which the state operates 
through autonomy-seeking agents (Gouldner, 1954) of service delivery. Since the effect 
of institutional isomorphism is homogenisation, the best indicator of isomorphic change 
is a decrease in variance and diversity. Britain, Germany, France, and Italy present an 
opportunity to examine how four European countries with a similar desire on the part of 
their central and local governments to improve the performance of their public welfare 
organisations, but with very different political and administrative systems and different 
financial problem’s pressures, have responded similarly to the pressures challenging 
TRUDI (Zürn and Leibfried, 2005).  In this paper I contend that the organisations of 
service delivery are becoming more similar cross-nationally, without necessarily mak-
ing them more efficient though. The striking process of organisational homogenisation 
within similar organisational fields is driven by legitimacy rather than merely perform-
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ance goals. An important question for convergence, thus, is not only the one of narrow-
ing variance, but also that of motivational drivers and causal mechanisms. Why would 
organisational fields across countries adopt similar structures, in light of weak support-
ing evidence of efficiency gains? Pressures of reinforcing political legitimacy are very 
strong and organisational forms diffuse across sectors and countries. Organising influ-
ences the relationship between forms and the formation of legitimacy and the type of 
conflict (Olsen, 1996).  
As the empirical discussion in the second part of the paper reveals, organisational 
‘autonomy’ is the new ubiquitous design for most welfare public organisations. The 
popularity and attractiveness of this type of organisational change stems from the most 
recent developments in the practice of administrative reforms in the OECD countries.  
The conceptual aspect of autonomy which this paper refers to is the notion of ‘bureau-
cratic’ autonomy defined as the formal exemption of an agency supervisory board from 
full political supervision by the departmental minister (Christiansen, 1999). The breach 
from hierarchy may happen by granting structural autonomy, namely the insertion of an 
alternative or competing level of overall supervision like a governing body. The overall 
effects of mimetic isomorphism, leading to homogeneity in welfare delivery institu-
tions, and of the emergence of a dominant organisational model, are to legitimise depo-
liticised modes of governance.4 I argue that the very fact that organisational autonomy 
becomes normatively sanctioned increases the likelihood of its adoption, even in the 
face of different environmental conditions and different welfare regimes.  
I. AUTONOMY-SEEKING WELFARE AGENTS AND LEGITIMACY 
Financial uncertainty is one of the most important problem pressure and precipitating 
factors for the adoption of organisational models inspired by the private ‘enterprise’ 
(Obinger et al, forthcoming). The efficient management of welfare services has gained a 
prominent position on the agenda of European governments, not only for it is claimed to 
                                                 
4 Principal-agent theories point to the importance of certain formal controls, like partisan appointment at the head 
of executive agencies or budget setting, for elected politicians to limit ‘agency losses’. Studies on the politics of 
delegation have addressed the question of post-delegation political control and agency’s independence from parti-
san politics (Thatcher, 2005). The main concern of principal-agent theories is assessing the degree of agency loss, 
with relatively less emphasis on the wider implications of non-majoritarian institutions for the democratic order 
as a whole. The central idea that depoliticisation implies a ‘shift’ from one policy arena to another seems to be at-
tractive, so as to underpin much of the public policy debate in Britain, including the recent work of Burnham, 
Buller and Flinders. Depoliticisation is understood as ‘the process of placing at one remove the political character 
of decision-making’ (Burnham, 2001: 128).  Hence, depoliticisation primarily responds to a strategy of blame 
avoidance, for politicians seek to avoid responsibility or unpopular decisions.  One of the main shortcomings of 
this body of literature is that it is highly contextualised and exclusively British.  
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gain popular support in the run-up of national elections, but also for it promises to solve 
the overriding financial pressures on mature welfare states. As DiMaggio and Powell 
argue in their seminal work (1983: 151), ‘modelling is a response to uncertainty and 
ambiguity about goals’. Organisational models are very powerful because structural 
changes are visible to all, citizens and policy makers, whereas changes in processes are 
less noticeable. For the survival and legitimacy of institutions it is essential to be per-
ceived to be innovative, even in the absence of strong concrete evidence that the 
adopted models enhance efficiency. The reorganisation of welfare bureaucracies at both 
central and sub-national levels of government in European countries has been associated 
from the mid-80s with the shift from bureaucratic to managerial types of public organi-
sations (Aucoin, 1990; Hood, 1991). A new administrative paradigm is at the heart of 
the ‘managerial revolution’ transforming the welfare state in Europe (Wright, 1994). Its 
central myth is entrepreneurialism, associated with New Public Management (NPM) 
(Hood, 1991; Christiansen and Laegreid, 2001). Organisational legitimacy is no longer 
derived from input and the legality of procedures, but from output and results.  Reform 
programmes strengthen the discretion of managers in relation to politicians, transfer 
democratic representation to ‘stakeholders’ (Peters, 1996), and create structural barriers 
between political leadership and organisational autonomy (e.g. independent executive 
agencies, joint executive committees). Change does not only affect organisational struc-
tures, but it transforms the culture and normative values of welfare organisations. Social 
workers are encouraged to become ‘entrepreneurial’, which amount to be more con-
cerned with cash flows and balancing income, than people. The entrepreneurial and 
autonomous organisation is usurping the traditional type of welfare delivery institution, 
which was an important source of political legitimacy for the nation state (Ashford, 
1986).  
The governance structure and process of welfare delivery institutions have been sub-
ject to profuse and profound transformations as a result of politicians abdicating their 
responsibility for decision-making in favour of public managers, in the name of organ-
isational autonomy. The central research question of this paper pertains to the reorgani-
sation of the internal governance of welfare institutions, as a result of widespread gov-
ernment’s programmes to grant autonomy to them, and to their managers in relation to 
politicians. From data collected for the T.H. Marshall project5, I see preliminary sup-
porting evidence of the thesis of converging organisational isomorphism with entrepre-
neurialism and administrative decentralisation and autonomy. Organisational arrange-
                                                 
5 Research on this paper commenced in 2005 thanked to the support of the T H Marshall Fellowship, awarded by 
the Department of Social Policy, LSE, and embedded at the Transformations of the State Research Centre, Bre-
men.  
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ments can make a great deal of difference to the success of a social policy.  Until the 
early 1980s in Britain, and most recent years in continental Europe, political considera-
tions were a pivotal element of schools and hospitals’ governance systems (Glennerster, 
2000). Supervisory boards were composed of members which included local councillors 
and elected local politicians. Political leaders were directly involved in planning activi-
ties and making allocative decisions. Reforms associated with the ‘participatory’ and 
‘flexible’ state (Peters, 1996) have changed the mechanisms of political accountability. 
The adoption of NPM has tilted the balance towards autonomy, at the expense of tradi-
tional forms of political accountability6. Management boards of public hospitals and 
schools have acquired new responsibilities and benefited from diminishing political 
control (Kampe and Kracht, 1989; Saltman, Busse and Mossialos, 2002).  
Hence, public organisations are no longer instrumental, but institutional actors. Wel-
fare organisations do often adapt to their institutional context, but they often play an 
active role in shaping those contexts (Parsons, 1956). Interviews have suggested that 
national governments find it increasingly difficult to control welfare bureaucracies be-
cause the organisational source of legitimacy of hospitals and schools has changed. 
Welfare organisations show considerable ability to survive, precisely because they in-
corporate powerful myths and ‘institutionalised rules’ (Meyer and Rowan, 1977), like 
entrepreneurialism and good management. Thus, organisational success depends not 
only on matching the demands of internal efficiency, but also on conformity to the pre-
vailing normative obligations (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). These myths are binding 
on organisations, for they create the necessity to redefine their internal organisational 
structures accordingly. External institutionalised rules are a legitimate source of organ-
isational structure, which is not only the result of apolitical engineering. Entrepreneuri-
alism functions, then, as a myth for welfare organisations and its high institutionalisa-
tion in advanced democracies implies that there may be limited influence of political 
parties.7  
                                                 
6 For Bovens (Bovens 2006: 16), whose definition this paper adopts, accountability consists of three main ele-
ments: 1) giving an account; 2) questioning or debating the issues; and 3) evaluation or passing a judgement. The 
main assumption is that accountability is retrospective (Harlow and Rawlings, 2006). Political accountability is a 
very important type of accountability. Voters delegate their sovereignty to popular representatives, who in turn, 
delegate political authority to a cabinet of ministers. In parliamentary systems with strong ministerial accountabil-
ity, such as the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Germany, public servants and departmental units are ac-
countable to their ministers, who must render political account to parliament.   
7 For a comprehensive discussion of the role of parties and political variables in explaining welfare state dynamics 
in the last two decades, see Kittel and Obinger, 2003. They argue that the 1990s reorientation towards budget 
consolidation happened regardless of ideological orientation.  
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New Public Management reforms are based on a rather misleading view of the state 
and any promise of enhanced political control is based on a quite simplistic view of po-
litical processes. I sustain that welfare organisations are locked into isomorphism with 
their depoliticised environment. I doubt that party appointment, a formal mechanism of 
control, is effective in practice. The re-assertion of politics within welfare organisations 
could be effective in practice, if these organisations incorporate externally legitimated 
structures fundamentally different from the myth of entrepreneurialism. To the extent 
that parties are unable to reaffirm their partisan and representative function, they may 
not succeed in enforcing environmentally institutionalised rules of electoral accountabil-
ity and democratic legitimacy. Hence, organisations struggling for survival and re-
sources will depend on alternative legitimating rules, especially in highly institutional-
ised contexts such as mature welfare states. The reassertion of politics based on party 
appointment and formal control, without the necessary reaffirmation of the traditional 
legitimating framework of representative and electoral democracy, is deemed to fail, for 
organisational legitimacy is shaped increasingly by the external myth of entrepreneurial-
ism and managerialism. These myths create the necessity for profound changes to or-
ganisational structures and internal redefinition of political and administrative responsi-
bilities (March and Simon, 1958).  
How did it happen that modelling of welfare state organisations has been permeated 
by rules borrowed by the transformative processes of administrative reforms (March 
and Olsen, 1989; Christensen, Laegreid and Wise, 2002)?8 In search of solutions, politi-
cal leaders and social policy advisers in Britain and Germany, and other continental 
European countries, have looked at the nearby field of administrative reforms of the 
civil service for ready-made alternatives to traditional bureaucratic welfare delivery 
systems.  Hence, welfare reforms have become imbued with New Public Management 
ideas (Hood, 1991; Christensen and Laegreid, 2001), including organisational autonomy 
and decentralised modes of governance. 
In contrast to the public-utilities component, the welfare state is clearly being re-
formed both in the organisational and territorial sense (Rothang, Obinger and Leibfried, 
2006). ‘Autonomy’ has been a recurrent theme of public services reforms since the 
                                                 
8  As discussed in more details in Christensen, Laegreid and Wise (2002: 154), the transformative perspective as-
sumes that administrative and political leaders operate under unique conditions that may facilitate or limit the ex-
tent to which they are able to pursue an active administrative policy. Thus, rather than using the comparative 
method to identify universal principles that transcend national cases, they employ the transformative approach to 
increase the understanding of how shared administrative reform policies are transformed by case-specific contex-
tual factors. The transformative approach perspective is drawn heavily on the broad institutional approach by 
March and Olsen, but it is refined by applying it to comparative public administration. 
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1980s. Its normative underpinning and doctrinal legacy have been associated with New 
Public Management (NPM) and entrepreneurial behaviour (Saltman, Busse and Mossia-
los, 2002). One of its core elements is the preference for more specialised and autono-
mous organisational forms and ‘flexible government’ (Hood, 1995; Peters, 1996), which 
are given a clear set of targets to achieve, and a greater discretion to decide how to go 
about achieving them. In a restricted sense, autonomy refers to the freedoms of individ-
ual public managers, summarised in the slogan ‘let the managers free to manage’ (Os-
borne and Gaebler, 1992). A more comprehensive definition of autonomy for the pur-
poses of this paper also includes the changes of the organisational management and 
governance (Ouchi, 1979).  
Among the various alleged benefits of autonomy, disaggregation of the organisations 
in smaller units makes it possible to put the experts in charge of the decision-making 
process. This results in a more efficient use of human resources, for there is no point in 
employing highly qualified managers and then interfering in their daily operations. 
Autonomy from central government direct control allegedly unleashes the entrepreneu-
rial skills of public managers, liberating them from the political ‘burden’ of the interfer-
ence of their political masters. Decisions over resource allocation at the level of the de-
livery organisation would be made on technical grounds, or professional, without being 
left to the interplay of partisan pressures. The nature of allocation decision may change 
over time or differ between countries. Generally, it is likely to be more technical when it 
takes place at the periphery, whereas it is more open, recognised and more ‘political’ 
when it is a matter of central concern (Glennerster, 1975: 39).  
Another benefit of organisational unit autonomy is greater responsiveness to local 
needs and local communities in line with the ‘participatory state’ (Peters, 1996). Auton-
omy appears to be an attractive reform idea to welfare states with a high degree of func-
tional centralisation, e.g. the National Health Care System in Britain. Autonomy en-
hances the responsiveness of the organisation to local communities. They establish pri-
orities according to locally determined needs, for a uniform service across the countries 
would lead to inappropriate use of resources. Autonomy underpins the shift from politi-
cal to technical decision-making, shifting the balance of responsibility for performance 
from central politicians to local managers. The nature of decision-making becomes 
more ‘privatised’, in Schattschneider’s terms (1975). Political debate becomes less rele-
vant to the system of decision-making, which is increasingly closed and ‘unrecognised’ 
(Glennerster, 1975). 
Despite these alleged benefits, granting autonomy to public hospitals and schools has 
proved highly problematic and contested. Constructing a structural barrier between cen-
tral political leadership and the local management of service delivery has decreased the 
capacity of politicians to exert democratic political control on schools and hospitals. On 
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one hand, this was the intended effect of granting autonomy to delivery units, namely 
the possibility of liberating managers from political interference. On the other hand, this 
generates a dilemma between effective democratic control by political elected represen-
tatives, and the rise of functionally and technically legitimated policymaking.  As Chris-
tensen and Laegreid have suggested, structural devolution associated with NPM means 
‘a decrease in the central capacity and authority of control and less attention to political 
considerations in the subordinate units’ (Christensen and Laegreid, 2001: 81). This 
raises the question of the relationship between managerial and political accountability 
(Day and Klein, 1987) and how it is shaped up by recent reforms of public schools and 
hospitals in Germany and Britain.  
Central governments want to maximise day-to-day managerial freedoms, and to en-
sure simultaneously that delivery units produce results which are consistent with policy 
objectives. The organisational governance of social services delivery is complicated by 
the fact that outputs are difficult to measure and ‘production’ processes are less explicit 
and transparent than in private markets (Ouchi, 1979). The price is not a clearing 
mechanism between demand and supply (Legrand et al, 1998). According to Powell and 
DiMaggio, there are two important organisational-level preconditions for processes of 
mimetic isomorphism. First, they argue that uncertainty in the relationship between 
means and ends will create incentives for organisations to model themselves after those 
they perceive to be successful. Secondly, they hypothesise that conflicting goals of an 
organisation, as it is of the case of public hospitals, will make organisation increasingly 
dependent upon appearances of legitimacy (Powell and DiMaggio, 1983: 155). These 
preconditions are particularly pronounced in the case of organisations responsible for 
welfare service delivery, which are constantly struggling to meet conflicting demands of 
performance and equity. 
Managerial accountability has different dimensions, discussed by Day and Klein 
(1987). Mainly they refer to financial accountability, as public managers have become 
responsible for devolved budgets to schools and hospitals. The delivery of public ser-
vices in the last years has been marked by greater devolution of budgets to lower level 
units within the public sector (Glennerster, 2000). For instance, as I will discuss later 
on, some schools in England were allowed to ‘opt out’ of local education authority’s 
control and became more autonomous. Financial accountability consists of spending the 
allocated money according to appropriate rules within an agreed legislative framework. 
Another important component of managerial accountability is efficiency accountability, 
which refers to the process of generating value for money. Input and output oriented 
managerial types of accountability depend ultimately on measuring performance and 
assessing organisational efficiency. In the case of most welfare services, outputs are not 
easily measurable nor are production processes clearly understood. The nature of mana-
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gerial accountability, thus, does not only depend on the unilateral shift from political to 
technical decision-making, but also, and most importantly, on the type of organisational 
governance which prevails within any organisation (March, 1988).  
Reforms centred around granting autonomy to public hospitals or schools have cre-
ated confusion and tension, especially in those systems with visible cases of maladmin-
istration, most visibly in Britain. When things go wrong and Parliament calls ministers 
to account for inefficiencies, they will displace blame to public managers, while inter-
vening in that public body’s internal affairs to make sure that criticism is addressed. 
Therefore, the trade off between autonomy and accountability becomes a dilemma in 
cases of maladministration and social services’ failings. Autonomy is difficult to sustain 
when things go wrong, and this problem is particularly acute for the British National 
Health Care System (NHS). Ministers fall back on the rhetoric of autonomous public 
managers being responsible for inefficiencies. This should not be surprising as the pub-
lic and Parliament are inclined to attribute blame rather than assessing the real causes of 
a crisis. The strategy of blame avoidance, which is equally employed by ministers and 
public managers in the policy making process, challenges all mechanisms of political 
accountability, displacing responsibility from one level to the other and leaving no one 
clearly accountable for results. Autonomy, thus, has the potentials of enhancing the pos-
sibilities for activating this type of strategy.  As we will discuss later for the case of 
British Foundation Hospitals, the reforms have devised formal ways of distancing min-
isters from hospitals, shifting political accountability to independent regulators and local 
communities.  
II. THE EUROPEAN CONTAGION OF THE WELFARE ‘ENTERPRISE’ MODEL  
The diffusion of the organisational form of the enterprise across different welfare re-
gimes and sectors resembles a process of ‘contagion’, as it was defined by the French 
school of scientific psychologists in the nineteenth century.9  It is a powerful force by 
which ideas are propagated and affirmed in different institutional contexts. This process 
of contagion is not necessarily a response to rational calculations, but to policy makers’ 
perceptions of what is modern and innovative. As discussed later, local governments 
were persuaded to adopt New Public Management in Germany as a way to be modern 
and legitimate. This empirical section of the paper is aimed at establishing that the 
                                                 
9  Without wishing to engage in the antiegalitarian political and social thought of Le Bon in this paper, his formula-
tion of the ‘scientific’ process of psychological contagion is of some relevance. In Psychologie des Foules (1896), 
Gustave Le Bon analyses how an idea become popular, through a pathological process of ‘contagion’. The em-
phasis of French experimental psychology was on pathologies and the Idée fixe (Nye, 1975), which was the 
commitment to a fixed idea which became anchored in the emotional and organic substratum of the mind. Conta-
gion is, thus, an irrational process of diffusion of ‘fixed ideas’.   
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autonomous organisation is becoming the predominant form of structure in Europe. For 
the purpose of this, this part of the paper will focus primarily on the organisational 
fields of secondary education and health care. The case of Germany will receive greater 
and exclusive attention in section III of this paper, for its marked contrast across differ-
ent sectors which deserve a closer and more detailed analysis of primary sources than it 
is the case for Italy, France and Britain. 
Decentralised Educational Management in France, Italy and Britain 
The French and Italian administration of education is highly centralised and more insti-
tutionalised than in the United Kingdom or United States (Heidenheimer, 1983; OECD 
1995), as illustrated by the omnipresent and powerful field services of the central Minis-
try of Education, which exercise a tight supervision over schools at the local level. Both 
systems have their origins in the state intervention in the area of education, by which the 
State has to provide public education in the general interest of the nation. In France edu-
cation has been perceived as operating within a hierarchal system which has left very 
little room for organisational autonomy at the bottom (Archer, 1984; Champagne, Cot-
tereau, Dallemagne, and Malan, 1993). The French notion of public service (service 
public) provides the foundation for the operational principles of the French educational 
system and the rights and obligations of its employees (Cole 2000). The Reform of the 
State introduced by Alain Juppé’s government in the July 199510 viewed the ministerial 
field services as constituting the main impetus to change. This reform together with the 
Public Service Renewal represented a cultural challenge for the field services in acquir-
ing greater autonomy in their operational management and reducing their dependency 
on the central ministries (Cole and Jones, 2005: 572).  
The major theme of the reform of education in the 1990s in Italy has been equally the 
autonomy of schools (Mattei, 1999). By ‘autonomy’, the reforms refer to devolved re-
sponsibility for the organisational, educational and budgetary management of individual 
high schools from the central administration of the Ministry of Education and its field 
services, the ‘Provveditorati agli Studi’ to individual schools. This process is in line 
with NPM ideas of decentralisation of managerial responsibilities (Pollitt, 2000).  How-
ever, the confusion deliberately created between territorial decentralisation of state 
functions to regions and provinces and granting organisational autonomy to schools has 
hindered the potentially beneficial aspects of the reform of education in Italy. 
In Italy, the autonomy of individual schools has been misapplied. Decentralisation 
has created a duplication of administrative control over what were supposed to be 
emerging autonomous schools.  The Italian experimentation of autonomy of schools has 
distorted the rationale of decentralisation of responsibilities to smaller and independent 
                                                 
10  Circulaire du 26 Juillet 1995 
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units as advanced by NPM. For instance, a clear inconsistency with NPM can be re-
vealed in the reform of the headteacher’s employment contract. The headmaster was 
granted managerial responsibilities and greater discretion over the budget and admini-
stration. However, the reform was not bold enough. As the ‘manager’ of a public ser-
vice, the headmaster is responsible for the achievement of specific targets and operates 
under the logic of private sector management, the maximisation of profits and cost-
benefit assessments. However, even though the headmaster of an Italian school has ac-
quired new responsibilities, both organisational and administrative, he remains a civil 
servant. He is selected through a public competition (‘Concorso’) and has a guaranteed 
job, regardless of his achievements. The contract of employment is the one established 
by Law no.29 of 1993 regarding the ‘dirigenza pubblica’ (public sector managerial 
group of senior civil servants). Another implication of this type of contract is the inabil-
ity of the headmaster to hire and fire people according to the needs of the school or to 
their performance. The idea of managerialism, borrowed from NPM, is entrapped in the 
rigidly determined and legally bound Italian system of pay and conditions of employ-
ment.   
The main objectives of the education reform, as stated by Minister Berlinguer,11 Min-
ister of Education under the 1996 Prodi government, and as found in the Charter for the 
Service of Education,12 include: the autonomy of schools and the decentralisation of 
responsibilities from the centre to the periphery;13 attribution of managerial responsibili-
ties to the headmaster;14 a change of administrative culture; and improved quality of 
service.  
Autonomy of schools is the subject of a long-lasting debate that has brought concrete 
results only in recent years. The aim is to reduce the dirigiste and ‘centralist hypertro-
phy’.15 A wide range of formal procedures limits the freedom of manoeuvre of schools 
that wish to respond to different local needs. Moreover, the headmaster is not free to 
hire any personnel. Rather, the local field administration of the Ministry, the Provvedi-
                                                 
11  Luigi Berlinguer, ‘Un’Anno di Svolta’, in Annali della Pubblica Istruzione, no.1, 1997. 
12 The Charter for the Service of Education was adopted by the Dini Government in 1995. It is one of a series of 
public service charters. The inspiration behind this initiative is the British model of the Citizens’ Charter, 1991. 
13 Decentralisation of state administration is a broad phenomenon that involves most policy areas. Law no. 59, the 
Bassanini Law, named after the Minister of Public Service under the Prodi Government, gives authority to the 
government to decentralise powers to the regions and local administration. Education was also affected by these 
changes. 
14 The head teacher would have the same contract as a director general (‘dirigente’) in the public sector. This means 
a higher salary and greater budget and management responsibilities. 
15  Bill no.779, ‘Riforma dell’amministrazione scolastica’, November 17 1992. 
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torato, allocates teachers to different schools. The distribution of teachers does not al-
ways respond to objective criteria, such as number of pupils or schools in the local area. 
In most instances, the only concern is to maintain the employment level.  Granting 
autonomy gives the headmaster responsibility for the management of the factors of pro-
duction (teachers and infrastructures). Budgetary autonomy seems to be particularly 
important because, under the old system, the allocation of public money to schools de-
pended on covering personnel costs. It was not based on output, that is, on the number 
of students or the number of classes (Buratti, 1993:411). The rigid system of public 
money allocation and its management did not allow schools that offered a better service 
to continue improving. By contrast, the aim of the new system of autonomy provides for 
individual schools to control directly their budget and the quality and efficiency of ser-
vice. The aim is to stop the system whereby demand is created by supply. 
Organisational autonomy has been debated and adopted also in the French education 
systems since the 1980s, as a way to overcome excessive centralisation. The process of 
deconcentration starts with the Law of March 2, 1982, concerning droit et liberté des 
communes, des departments et des regions. The legislative impetus continued through 
the 1980s and 1990s (OECD 1996: 35-37). During those decades the collèges and ly-
cées were given juridical autonomy and acquired a significant scope of autonomus deci-
sion making. The organisational autonomy reforms went hand in hand with the process 
of regionalisation, which culminated in the 1989 Loi d’orientation, conferring to re-
gional governments the responsibility of secondary schooling.  
The French Education Ministry is organised along regional lines. A rector is the min-
ister’s direct representative in the provinces. The rectorate is a complex organisational 
structure with major service delivery responsibilities. The rectorates represent the field 
services of the Education Ministry. Reforms in the 1990s have introduced globalised 
budgets and cost centres status for rectorates, which were granted greater financial fle-
xibility and autonomy in setting targets and allocating resources. However, as Cole and 
Jones show in their findings (2005: 575), there are obstacles to change, including the 
continued dependency of local services from the Finance Ministry and the opposition of 
trade unions, which are openly suspicious of moves to delegate greater responsibility to 
the field services.  
The historical legacy of education policy in England is engrained in liberalism, with 
limited co-ordination of provision and pedagogical leadership by the State. From the 
19th century to the early 20th century managers and governors were in general active as 
school leaders. In a hierarchical and class stratified society a head teacher was not ex-
pected to have much institutional leadership in schools, with the exception of independ-
ent public schools (fee-paying). What was expected from a head teacher in state funded 
schools was moral and pedagogical, but not institutional management, which was the 
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responsibility of schools’ governors (Anderson, 2001). The head teachers have bene-
fited from the autonomy of English schooling. They were able to establish from the 
1950s to 1970s a measure of considerable professional dominance over administrative 
and local agencies (Grace, 1993). In comparative terms, English schooling had acquired 
a relatively large degree of cultural and pedagogic autonomy, particularly in the secon-
dary sector.   
The novelty of British New Labour’s reform programme, centred on decentralisation 
and autonomy, thus, should be assessed against the historical legacy and development 
patterns of education in England.16 The British education system, in comparison to the 
French and Italian one, has traditionally been decentralised and it has suffered from the 
late development of a state public administration (Heidenheimer, 1983). Prime Minister 
Tony Blair has announced the 2005 White Paper as ‘a pivotal moment to ensure fair 
funding and fair admissions’ and vindicates the 1997 pledge that education would be at 
the core of New Labour’s reform programmes.17 Indeed, key elements of the White Pa-
per have antecedents in past reforms, including the 2004 Five Year Strategy for Chil-
dren and Learners,18 and, most significantly for the issue of organisational structure and 
governance, to the 1998 School Standards and Framework Act. The 2005 White Paper 
raised most concerns in relation to an allegedly new type of school organisation, the 
Trust school.19  
Through the creation and support of Trust schools, the Blair government has sought 
to promote this type of organisation as a way forward for the future. The main objec-
tives were to ‘create independent self-governing state schools’, as the Secretary of State 
has announced to the House of Commons.20 This plan was also introduced one year ear-
                                                 
16  In this paper the main concern is not with a discussion of teaching and learning in secondary schools, but with the 
governance structures of autonomous schools and the changing balance between local schools autonomy and lo-
cal control by local educational authorities (LEAs). Consequently, issues of pedagogical autonomy will remain 
subordinate to the main focus on institutional autonomy and new governance structures established by the 2005 
White Paper Higher Standards, Better Schools for All. 
17  ‘Blair sweeps aside critics of school reform’, The Guardian, 25 October 2005 
18  Department of Education and Skills (DfES), Five Year Strategy for Children and Learners, Cm 6272, July 2004 
19  There were other important areas of policy developments, such as increasing diversity and choice in the provision 
of education, the greater participation of parents and pupils in improving standards of schools, the individualisa-
tion of education tailored to individual needs, new measures to tackle failure and underperformance of schools, 
and better discipline. In this section, I focus on the creation of Trust schools as new organisational arrangements 
emphasising autonomy of schools and freedoms from the control of local educational authorities, rather than what 
happens in schools and classrooms. 
20  Ruth Kelly, Secretary of State for Education,  House of Commons Debate, cols. 169 to 172, 25 October 2005 
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lier when the Blair government aimed to provide ‘freedom for all secondary schools to 
own their land and buildings, manage their assets, employ their staff, improve their 
governing bodies, and forge partnership with outside sponsors and educational founda-
tions’.21 Therefore, the independence of schools has been for some time at the heart of 
the Government’s proposals for change in the administration of education.   
The policy trajectory of autonomy for secondary schools reveals a high degree of 
continuity, since 1998, when the School Standards and Framework Act, the first of the 
then new Labour Government, appeared to sanction definitely the demise of grant-
maintained schools (GM), which had been the epitome of individual schools’ autonomy 
from local authorities’ control. The 1998 Act marked the end of the opportunity for 
schools to become grant-maintained, thus eliminating the controversial opportunity for 
opting out of LEAs control, introduced as part of the 1988 Education Reform Act by a 
previous Conservative Government (Fitz, Halpin and Power, 1997). A detailed analysis 
of the 1998 Act reveals that the GM existing schools were submerged into a new cate-
gory, so-called Foundation schools. This category included governors’ responsibility for 
the employment of staff and ownership of assets and ensued the retention of key ele-
ments of the structure associated with GM schools (Whitty et al, 1998). 
The 2005 White Paper, while allegedly creating ‘new’ Trust schools, in reality repre-
sents another re-branding exercise. In fact, Trust schools will enjoy the freedoms of 
Foundation schools and are designed to resemble their organisational and self-
governing structures: ‘Trust schools will have the freedoms and flexibilities that self-
governing (Foundation) schools currently enjoy.  They will employ their own staff, con-
trol their own assets and set their own admission arrangements’.22  Trusts will be not-
for-profit organisations, able to appoint governors to the school. The governing body 
will include elected parents, staff governors and representatives from the local authority 
and local communities.23  
As I mentioned since the start of this section, head teachers have significantly 
changed their managerial role in the last thirty years. They have increasingly distanced 
themselves from classrooms purposes (Grace, 1993). From pedagogical and moral lead-
ership, they have developed into powerful leaders of institutional change and champions 
of institutional autonomy of schools. The leadership role of head teachers has been ad-
vocated by the educational management gurus (Chubb and Moe, 1990). It is especially 
the self-governing schools that sustain a heavy top down approach and strong manage-
rial responsibilities of head teachers. Collegiality is more symbolic than substantive in 
                                                 
21  DfES, Five Year Strategy for Children and Learners, 2004.  
22  2005 White Paper, Chapter 2, Para 2.16. 
23   2005 White Paper, Chapter 2, Pars 2.10 to 2.12. 
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autonomous schools in England. On the contrary, there has been a consistent consolida-
tion of a managerial structure with a heavily vertical and hierarchical culture within 
schools. Head teachers are at the interface of central state policy framework and local 
market pressures to attract pupils and develop innovative and specialist’s curricula. Not 
shielded by the local administration, managers of schools are exposed directly to the 
blame of school failures. Their accountability for results and raising standards is highly 
personalised (Power, Halpin, and Whitty, 1997), and no longer mediated through insti-
tutional mechanisms.   
Public Management Reforms and Hospitals 
Health care services are an extraordinary experimental ground for introducing wider 
political and institutional transformations of the State. The adoption of entrepreneurial-
ism into European health care systems has strengthened technocratic decision-making 
over traditional mechanisms of political control. At the beginning of the 1990s, in the 
midst of a severe legitimacy crisis affecting the Italian administrative and political sys-
tem, New Public Management ideas seemed ‘the’ remedy against the pathological poli-
ticisation of distributive policies. Much hope has been placed since in a new and as-
cending group of general managers, entrusted with the ambitious mission of running 
health care services more efficiently and with the unenviable expectation of resuscitat-
ing public trust in welfare institutions. The 1992 Amato Government’s landmark health 
care reform transformed irreversibly the institutional arrangements and organisational 
structure of the Italian National Health Care System, by adopting the enterprise formula 
and the regionalisation of the health care sector (Mattei, 2006). 
Two major themes run through the 1992 health care reform. The first is the introduc-
tion of private-sector management practice, which has led to the creation of the new 
post of general manager to head the administration of local health care authorities and 
public hospitals and the ‘privatisation’ of the public sector employment contract. The 
second is the decentralisation of administrative responsibilities to regional levels of 
government, which has been conducive to a restructuring of relationships between dif-
ferent levels of government, to the emergence of regions as a new political locus of 
power, and to a fundamental reshaping of local politics. The greatest novelty of the 
1992 reform was the shift from a politico-representative to a technical-managerial type 
of health care administration (Rebora 1999). When the Italian national health care sys-
tem was created in 1978, local health authorities became a fiefdom of local ‘notables’ 
who would establish their power base by distributing social benefits. This practice was 
perpetrated through management committees composed of locally elected officials and 
trade union representatives (Ferrera 1989; Hine 1993).  Since political parties used these 
management committees as an arena for party competition in local electoral politics, 
they have generally opposed the introduction of general management and the creation of 
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a new executive post at the head of local health authorities and public hospitals, claim-
ing that the rise of powerful bureaucrats would undermine supposedly democratic repre-
sentation. However, as political parties decreased their ‘veto power’ during the 1992-94 
crisis, technical governments had the opportunity to push radical reforms more force-
fully through political institutions (Freddi, Fabbrini et al 2000).  
As far as France is concerned, the 1996 Health Reform signalled a clear adoption of 
New Public Management ideas (Minvielle, 2006). The Juppé ordinances aimed to de-
centralise and review health care management. They also confirmed the decentralised 
style of public intervention through the creation of the Regional Hospital Agencies 
(Agences Régionales de l’Hospitalisation, ARHs), which were mandated to control 
costs. The creation of these new autonomous agencies provided new ways of planning 
and allocating resources. They illustrate a case of what is called ‘déconcentration’ in 
French public administration. One of the most significant elements of this process has 
been reinforcing legitimacy. The Directors of the ARHs were conferred a higher legiti-
macy, for they are appointed by the Council of Ministers. Since the early days of the 
1996 reform, Directors have occupied a prominent position in the hierarchical ladder.  
Despite much scepticism expressed by observers and the research community, the 
current organisational arrangements of public hospitals in the British NHS deeply re-
flect the faith in the distinction between policy and operation. This tenet of NPM, intro-
duced by the Conservative governments in the early 1990s (Klein, 2001) continues un-
abated even in the most recent reforms of New Labour. NHS Foundations Trusts were 
established by the 2003 Health and Social Care (Community Health and Standards) Act 
as independent public benefit corporations modelled on co-operative and mutual tradi-
tions. This was a new type of organisation in the British NHS, marking a departure from 
the NHS Trusts created in the early 1990s to give them operational independence from 
their local District Health Authority (DHA).24 New Labour has maintained the reform 
commitment of previous governments to the principles of decentralisation and devolu-
tion of managerial responsibilities to local public hospitals, which were not found to be 
sufficiently free from central government interference.25 In fact, one of the main charac-
teristics of the British NHS is that trusts had a direct link of accountability with the Sec-
retary of State for Health. S/he could give legally binding direction to a Trust and could 
dismiss the Trust’s Chair and non-executive directors, appointed by the Secretary of 
State. The 2003 Act created new Foundation Trusts, following application procedures, 
                                                 
24  The NHS and Community Care Act, 1990, established that the District Health Authorities (DHAs) became pur-
chasers of the services provided by NHS Trusts and their relationship be governed by ‘contracts’. The contracts 
set out what services Trusts would provide and how much the DHAs would pay. 
25  Department of Health, A Guide to NHS Foundations Trusts (Department of Health, 2002) 
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which would prove that hospitals met the standards, and requirements set by the newly 
established independent regulator, Monitor. Currently, at the time of writing, there are 
48 Foundation Trusts and the Secretary of State has announced her plan to consolidate 
this programme and supported the next wave of mental health foundation trusts. 26 
The purpose of establishing NHS Foundation Trusts is to devolve power and greater 
autonomy to the local level so that local hospitals are better able to respond to the needs 
of patients and local communities. This is achieved in two ways: through a new system 
of accountability and greater autonomy from the Secretary of State’s direct control. The 
new system of devolved accountability to local ‘stakeholders’, including patients and 
staff, is intended to replace the traditional political accountability to the central level of 
government. The new governance arrangements offer the opportunity to members of the 
local communities to participate and influence the strategic development of the organi-
sation. Foundation Trusts will not be answerable to the Secretary of State, but to local 
people and Monitor, the new independent regulator. They will be free to pursue their 
own agenda in accordance with the priorities set by the community.  
The organisational governance structure reflecting this newly created accountability 
to local people is represented by the new Board of Governors, to which the Manage-
ment Board of the Foundation Trusts will be directly accountable. The Board consists of 
elected representatives of members of the Trust, i.e. registered residents and patients in 
the areas served by the NHS Foundation Trusts. Membership is open to all who wish to 
register with the public hospital and participate. Members are able to stand and to vote 
in elections to the Board of Governors of the NHS Foundation Trusts. This body is in-
tended to represent the interests of all stakeholders. Some places will be reserved for 
nominees of other local health bodies, such as Primary Care Trusts which commission 
services from the hospitals.27 The Board is responsible, thus, for respecting the interests 
of the local community in the management and strategic development of the NHS 
Foundation Trust. It is expected to receive regular information about the Trust and be 
consulted, twice a year, for future development. The Board has important powers in 
appointing the Chair and the non-executive directors of the Board of Directors, which 
has exclusive responsibility for the operational matters, e.g. setting budgets, staff pay 
and others. It has also the power to approve the appointment of the chief executive by 
the Chair.  
                                                 
26  Press release, 18 January 2006, Department of Health. 
27  The reserved places are: at least one governor representing local NHS Primary Care Trusts; at least one governor 
representing Local Authorities in the area; at least three governors representing staff; a Chair; at least one gover-
nor appointed from the local university. However, the majority of governors are elected by members in the public 
constituency 
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NHS Foundation Trusts are claimed to enjoy greater freedoms and flexibility from 
Whitehall control and performance management by Strategic Health Authorities. They 
have freedom to access capital on the basis of affordability instead of the current system 
of centrally controlled allocations. Moreover, Foundation Trusts can invest surpluses in 
developing new services for local people. Granting autonomy to NHS Foundation 
Trusts has meant mainly a ‘negative’ freedom that lifts managers from the direct inter-
ference of the Secretary of State in the daily operations of local hospitals. This auton-
omy is enhanced, arguably, by the creation of a new independent regulator, Monitor, 
which acts as a new institutional buffer between Foundation Trusts and the Department 
of Health. This new public body, which is at arms’ length from the Department of 
Health, should serve as a safeguard against direct ministerial encroachment and political 
pressures. The regulator accounts directly to Parliament through an annual report. The 
main role of Monitor is to grant a licence to an applicant for Foundation Trust status, to 
monitor compliance with the terms of the licence, and to intervene in the event of 
breach of the terms. Monitor may issue warnings and, in the most serious cases, also 
dismiss members of the Board of Governors or Board of Directors and appoint interim 
members. 
III. GERMANY: FROM LAGGARD TO PIONEER? 
The German Länder have considerable centralised control over secondary schooling. 
Recent reforms at the end of the 1990s have opened up the possibility though to grant 
individual schools some autonomy over their teaching programmes. In selected Länder, 
including North Rhine Westphalia, and Hessen, pilot projects and experimentations 
have introduced some degree of autonomy from centralised controls by encouraging 
individual schools to design self-evaluation mechanisms and processes. The health care 
sector in Germany has also been subject to transformative changes and potential new 
developments concerning the management processes of individual hospitals, as the case 
of the Charité public hospital in Berlin.  
Self-Governing Schools 
Education and cultural affairs is, in Germany, a policy domain of sole responsibility for 
the Länder (states). Their jurisdiction is constitutionally guaranteed (Art. 31 of the 1949 
Basic Law) so that the Federal State and the government have no formal power to inter-
fere with the Länder’s policies on determining the curricula, staff and resources alloca-
tion, and, generally, the organisational structure of schools. At the federal level the co-
ordinating body for educational policy is the Standing Conference of Ministers of Edu-
cation, created in 1949. Since the start, the decision-making process of such coordinat-
ing institution has been veto driven, for unanimity is required. Despite the existence of 
this coordinating mechanism, education is off-limits for the federal government (All-
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mendinger and Leibfried, 2003). With respect to autonomy of individual schools, it has 
traditionally been very contained in Germany, given the strong hold of regional bu-
reaucracies on the education system. Thus, federalism has two main effects on the in-
troduction of reforms aimed at the autonomy of schools. First, it reinforces the depend-
ence of all secondary schools on the Ministry of Education of each Land for school per-
sonnel and finance, and on local counties for other resources. Thus, centralised control 
operates at the Land level. Inspection and supervision of individual schools is quite 
strong in Germany, compared to other decentralised educational systems, such as the 
British or American one. Secondly, education federalism does encourage policy ex-
perimentation and variety of organisational systems and provision (Manow, 2004). Al-
though federalism makes structural reforms difficult, Manow argues that outside social 
insurance we should expect high policy experimentation in the field of education (2004: 
33). 
For the purpose of this paper, I focus on the case of the Selbständige Schule in North 
Rhine-Westphalia, which stands out from the rest in terms of legislative and administra-
tive impetus to introduced autonomous and self-standing schools. Before considering 
this case in some details, I will briefly offer an overview of the differentiated degree of 
enthusiasm towards organisational autonomy that we see from Bavaria to Hessen. Bava-
ria belongs to a group of Länder which are the most conservative in terms of departure 
from the tradition of secondary education, whereas the states of Hessen and North 
Rhine-Westphalia have been the most dynamic in terms of embracing innovation and 
experimentations. The last one in particular is of special significance. 
In Bavaria, the educational system remains firmly entrenched into a hierarchical bu-
reaucratic system. School management is centralised at the Land level.28 The Ministry of 
Education establishes the details of the curriculum for all schools. The choice of books 
has to be approved by the Ministry, which also provides rigid guidelines for centralised 
examinations and students’ assessment exercises. Training of teachers is also a matter of 
sole responsibility of the Land, rather than individual schools. The head teacher is 
nominated by the Ministry of Education after public competition, as it is common to 
most German Länder.29 Thus, staff policy is highly centralised and not much discretion 
is left to individual schools. The post of head teacher in Bavaria is for five years and it 
is renewable. A school council, made of representative of teachers, pupils and parents, 
offers advice to the head teacher.  
                                                 
28  Bayerisches Gesetz über das Erziehungs- und Unterrichtswesen in der Fassung der Bekanntmachung, Bayeri-
sches Staatministerium für Unterricht und Kultus, 31 May 2000. 
29  Ibid., Article 57, Schulleiterin oder Schulleiter 
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In the state of Hessen, autonomy has been slowly developed through legislation. 
Each school is allowed to develop its own programme within the frame of the law and 
the curriculum. Schools have been increasingly encouraged to develop self-assessment 
methods within the search for quality assurance. A new pilot project has been recently 
launched, to run from 2005 until 2008, aimed at reorganising the internal structure of 
schools, and improving the quality of the service. An important element of the Modell-
projekt Selbstverantwortung plus is the organisational autonomy granted to schools, and 
the creation of new regional coordinating mechanisms.30 Within the framework of the 
general curriculum prescribed by the Ministry, schools are required to define their goals 
and priorities in self-developed schools’ programs. They must also submit themselves to 
internal and external evaluations.  
In 1992, North Rhine Westphalia had introduced a new experimental project for 
quality development and quality assurance, so-called QUESS. The central idea was the 
decentralisation of the school system by providing greater autonomy to individual 
schools. In 1997, the project was concluded with nineteen schools participating. They 
developed individual programmes, although they had to remain within the scope of ex-
isting curricula established by the Regional Ministry. The schools were responsible for 
self-evaluation, followed by external evaluations conducted by the school boards, which 
maintained a double function of supervising and providing advice to the schools. From 
1997 to 2002 the Ministry for Education of North-Rhine Westphalia launched a project 
aimed at improving the quality of learning and the efficiency of schools (Stärkung von 
Schulen im kommunalen und regionalen Umfeld). This trajectory of reforms geared 
towards granting freedom to individual schools has continued until recently with the 
2002-2008 ambitious project called Selbständige Schule. So far 270 schools have been 
involved and have witnessed internal management changes, such as the strengthening of 
the headmaster’s responsibility.31 
Through recent projects, the Land North Rhine-Westphalia has continued to remodel 
its relationship with public sector schools, along the theme of ‘Qualitätsorientierte 
Selbsteuerung von Schulen’, namely quality-oriented steering in schools, and ‘Region-
aler Bildungslandschaften’, namely the regional education area. Their activities fall into 
two major categories. Under labels like ‘new steering’, of which the Regionale 
Steuerungsgruppe are an illustration, the first type of activity is the development of IT-
                                                 
30  Modellprojekt Selbstverantwortung plus, Teilprojekt 3: Organisationsstruktur, Hessisches Kultusministerium, 
2005. 
31  ‘Verordnung zur Durchführung des Modellvorhabens Selbständige Schule’ Ministerium für Schule, Jugend und 
Kinder des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, 12 April 2002; Gesetz zur Weiterentwicklung von Schulen, 27 Novem-
ber 2001. 
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based new systems (‘Lernen mit Medien’). Accordingly, schools are encouraged to im-
plement innovative teaching systems and collaborate more closely with parents and 
form partnerships with voluntary and private sector organisations (‘zivilgesell-
schaftliches Engagement’).32 Secondly, performance standards and comparisons are 
being developed, together with new organisational models, as interviews have con-
firmed (Banner 2004).  
Notwithstanding these few instances of experimentation in some Länder, the educa-
tional systems of Germany remains firmly entrenched in the tradition of stabilisation 
rather than change. Education federalism seems to facilitate ‘experimentations’, but 
institutional reengineering is not sufficient to defeat the historical legacy of an educa-
tional system which was the envy of Europe (Phillips, 1987). Continuity prevails over 
change, though reform attempts and windows of opportunities have been present, not 
least when the shocking negative results of the 2000 OECD  Programme for Interna-
tional Student Assessment (PISA) of competences of 15-year-olds were published. This 
created a deep legitimacy crisis in Germany (Leibfried and Allmendinger, 2003: 67), for 
it seemed that Germany may have been overtaken by other industrialised countries. 
Unlike Britain, German schools are reluctant to publish their individual data on results. 
This increases the difficulty in assessing the impact of the PISA shock on re-
legitimising reforms. The intensity of the public debate did not necessarily translate into 
radical reforms which would have been possible elsewhere. Strong federalism clearly is 
a hurdle for introducing reorganisation reforms. However, in the wake of PISA new or 
modified procedures of performance evaluations were demanded. Cost-cutting sugges-
tions, such as reducing the variety of number of courses, were proposed (Lingens, 
2005), 
Decentralisation to individual schools was part of the education reform plans that the 
Allies had proposed in the immediate post-war reconstruction (Ertl and Philipps, 2000). 
Yet, the German authorities opted for looking back to the reforming years of the Wei-
mar Republic and to readopt a system which seemed to have worked, the principle of 
‘On from Weimar’ (Phillips, 1987: 228). Stabilisation was the main concern of the first 
twenty years of the young Republic, ensuing from an inherited distrust for reforms after 
so much upheaval. The opportunity was missed to reform the old tripartite schooling 
system.33 The deep conservatism of German educationalists was successful in prevent-
                                                 
32  For an overview of the main projects and activities of the Land Nordrhein Westfalen, see  ‘Projekt Selbständige 
Schule und andere Projekt-Aktivitäten’, Ministerium für Schule, Jugend und Kinder des Landes Nordrhein-
Westfalen, 23 October 2003. 
33 Secondary schools are of three types in Germany, as outlined in the 1959 Rahmenplan (Outline Plan): Gymna-
sium (grammar school), Realschule (intermediate school), and Hauptschule (main secondary school). This system 
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ing major organisational restructuring of this system from the post-war to recent days. 
The strong historical tradition explains ultra conservative secondary school system and 
‘non-reforms’ (Robinson and Kuhlman, 1967). Therefore, policy stability is not only 
attributed to institutional factors, such as federalism, but most importantly to path de-
pendency in the policy developments. 
The distrust of new beginning and experiments, and the desire for social stability, 
was again confirmed by the missed opportunity to reform secondary education gener-
ated by the process of Reunification. As Wilde argues (2002), East Germany’s educa-
tional system was highly restructured and transformed on the model of West Germany, 
rather than triggering a reform of the old tripartite system. Reunification created a mo-
mentum for reflecting upon the modernisation that the secondary education system re-
quired. Yet, the opportunity was missed again to introduce greater autonomous deci-
sion-making, which makes for a learning environment which can adapt to local needs, 
as in the British school system. Again, education federalism did not seem to enhance 
policy innovation, but rather acted as a brake on experimentation.  
The New Governance System of the Charité 
There is to date very scarce empirical research concerning the management boards of 
German hospitals and their new decision-making arrangements, resulting from internal 
organisational restructuring. Furthermore, the existing literature rarely frames the dis-
cussion of hospital management changes within the wider debate of administrative re-
forms of modernisation.34 This paper is part of a larger project which seeks to analyse 
the changes to the organisational fields of hospitals.35 Public hospitals in Germany oper-
ate within a decentralised system of governance, which is not the result of top-down 
devolution, as in the UK, but represents the historical foundations of the German health 
                                                                                                                                               
is based on serving respectively three psychological and mental categories of pupils: the academic and theoreti-
cal, the technical and the practical. In comparison to other European systems, the German one is based on selec-
tion after two years of orientation and diagnosis of the students’ ability (Orientierungstufe).The Gymnasium is 
the most prestigious type and has a long and distinguished tradition dating from the days of Humboldt. Pupils of 
the Realschule would expect to become technicians, middle managers in industry, commerce and administration. 
This type has also its foundations in the nineteenth century tradition and it was created to meet the needs of indus-
try, commerce and the service sectors. The major aim of the Hauptschule is to prepare students for a period of 
qualified vocational education either in full-time education or in the ‘Dual System’ of education and training (Ertl 
and Phillips, 2000).  
34  Zukunftsorientierte Verwaltung durch Innovationen, Bundesministerium des Innern, 13 September 2006 
35  It is clear from primary documents that the health care sector reforms include a central element which pertains to 
the cut of red tape, that is ‘weniger Burokratie, straffere Strukturen, schnellere Entscheidungen’. See policy do-
cument entitled ‘Gesundheitsreform 2006- die wichtigsten Inhalte im überblick’, www.die-gesundheitsreform.de. 
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care system. The regulation governing management and accountability structure and 
processes of German public hospitals is very complex and detailed, and mainly en-
trenched in legal codes (Döhler, 1995). Hospital management and ownership arrange-
ments fall within the competences of the Länder, which share responsibility for health 
care delivery with the federal government and with corporatist non-governmental insti-
tutions. Management and supervisory functions are normally devolved to municipal 
level authorities, excluding the three City-States of Berlin, Bremen and Hamburg, 
which directly own their public hospitals. It is in the hospital field of Berlin and Ham-
burg that administrative reforms associated with New Public Management for hospitals 
have gone furthest. The research findings here presented are drawn from fieldwork in-
terviews with members of the management team of one of Berlin’s biggest public hospi-
tal network, Charité, the largest hospital in Europe, with nearly 15,000 employees, 
3,240 beds, 128 medical departments, treating roughly 123,000 inpatients and carrying 
out 900,000 outpatient consultations per year.36 Since 2003, the Charité has been headed 
by a full-time board of directors. 
The German health care sector is extremely diversified in terms of the internal or-
ganisation of public hospitals (Kampe and Kracht, 1989). The majority of Länder make 
detailed provisions with regard to the composition of management boards for public 
hospitals, which have limited autonomy in so far as they must operate within rigidly set 
rules and frameworks. The most detailed provisions at Länder level with respect to the 
roles and responsibilities of management boards and supervisory boards were found in 
Berlin. Berlin is an extreme case in which the Land runs its own hospitals with a con-
siderable degree of tight administrative control. The dominant governance element in 
Berlin is the Senatsverwaltung für Gesundheit, Soziales und Verbraucherschutz, which 
has major responsibility for the planning and organisation of the hospital system, among 
others.37 The Senate not only runs dependent public hospitals, but it also plans the level 
of provision based on unclear measures of ‘need’. It also supervises the negotiations and 
                                                 
36  Interviews at Charité were conducted by the author during November and December 2006. I am very grateful to 
all those interviewees who devoted much time and effort to support this research. Most interviews were carried 
out under arrangements of confidentiality and anonymity so that no quotation could be directly traced to any in-
dividual interviewees. The author is in the process of clearing anonymity, but before this is possible, interviews 
will remain anonymous at this moment in time (August 2007). 
37  Ergebnisse der Krankenhausplanung in der Zeit von 1990 bis 2004 in Berlin, Senatsverwaltung für Gesundheit, 
Soziales und Verbraucherschutz, 2005. This document provides detailed information concerning the main 
achievements of hospitals planning after the reunification, which includes 47% reduction in hospital beds in ten 
years (from 43,000 to 23,000), and the increasing costs since 1999. 
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bargaining between sickness funds and hospitals. At the regional level, thus, the City of 
Berlin represents a highly centralised system of hospital administration. 
The Charité is breaking radically with decades of tradition in hospital administration, 
in order to increase efficiency and transform the public delivery institution into an 
autonomous ‘enterprise’, able to compete on the market. Forcing all decision makers to 
adopt a deliberate commercial attitude is a unique approach for health services in Ger-
many, as claimed by the members of the management team, the Vorstand.38 The recent 
major organisational restructuring of this teaching hospital in 2005 has conferred full 
responsibilities for results to the Vorstand39, a rather slim group, made of a Chief Execu-
tive Officer, a Direktor des Klinikums (Director of the Medical Center), and a Dekan 
(dean of the medical school). The author has been told that the medical director has re-
cently become a deputy member of the Vorstand, with the aim to strengthen his or her 
management position of the medical profession. The medical director is primus inter 
pares and is elected among the staff physicians of the hospitals. At the end of the 1990s 
the introduction of managerial experiments in Hamburg and Berlin has changed the role 
of the medical director from primus inter pares to an assistant of the executive board. 
The members of the Vorstand are appointed by the Aufsichtsrat, namely the supervisory 
board, which is chaired by the Minister of Culture, Science and Research of Land Ber-
lin, currently Dr Thomas Flierl. Interviews with senior managers in the public hospitals 
of Berlin have suggested that senior management posts are highly political appoint-
ments. Managers are appointed on the basis of their competence and expertise, but it 
would be unthinkable not to be endorsed politically as well.  
In Germany there is a strong tradition of separate management and supervisory 
boards. In the case of most German public hospitals, elected politicians are members of 
the supervisory boards, unlike the NHS Trusts. The Charité has a supervisory board 
with 12 members, including Berlin’s Senator for Finance and Berlin’s Senator for Cul-
ture.40 If the two belong to different parties, decision-making becomes more difficult. 
                                                 
38  Letter to the Berlin’s mayor concerning the restructuring of Charité, unpublished document.  
 The Vorstand calls for greater autonomy and entrepreneurial freedoms: ‘nur in wirtschaftlicher Eigenverantwor-
tung der universitärer Autonomie sowie unternehmerischer Freiheit kann die Charité die von ihr erwartete erfül-
len’ 
39  Berliner Universitätsmedizingesetz, in Gesetz und Verordnungsblatt für Berlin, no.42, 15 Dezember 2005. Article 
12 establishes the responsibilities of the Vorstand, the Management Board, and Article 10 of the Aufsichtsrat, the 
Supervisory Board. 
40  In the Supervisory Board of Charité a problem of dual leadership has been reported. The current situation has 
improved from the past, but there has been always latent competition between the Finance and Cultural Ministers.  
Surprisingly the minister for health and social affairs is not a member. When the new law setting out the reorgani-
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For instance, in the past the PDS had encouraged a participatory governance model for 
Charité, whereas the SPD has supported a new entrepreneurial management with clear 
lines of responsibilities geared towards enterprise Charité. The hospitals’ supervisory 
board consists also of representatives for health affairs from the local authorities, and 
eminent scientists and academics. It has been suggested to the author that another clear 
indicator of the chain of political accountability running from the Berlin government 
down to the Supervisory and to the Managing Board is represented by the concurrence 
of the duration of a legislative term and the length of office of each hospital’s supervi-
sory board. This would imply that a new government could dismiss and replace member 
of the supervisory board, effectively illustrating a spoils-system.  
The supervisory board plays more than a symbolic and advisory role, as in the NHS 
Trust. On the contrary, it is entrusted with key decision-making power. The Aufsichtsrat 
of the Charité is not merely a consultative body, thus. Its responsibilities include the 
supervision of the legality of rules and procedures, the cost efficiency of the public en-
terprise (Wirtschaftlichkeit), the attainment of targets by the management board.  As we 
mentioned earlier, the supervisory board has ample discretion over the appointment of 
the members of the Vorstand, including the approval of the elected medical director. An 
important role is also to safeguard the medical teaching and the interests of research 
from the management boards’ decision. It is striking that the supervisory board has also 
control over the internal organisation of the Charité, when it does call the Vorstand to 
account for changes in the organisation of units and centres. Furthermore, it has a key 
role in investment decisions, together with the Berlin government.   
From the formal responsibilities set out in the statute it emerges that the management 
Board is constrained in its autonomy, especially in so far as the internal organisational 
design is concerned. In practice, interviews have suggested that indeed radical changes 
have taken place, but the necessary autonomy is limited by two sources: the Supervisory 
Board and the administration of the Land Berlin. With respect to the former, interfer-
ence includes decisions pertaining to outsourcing and buying shares of other companies. 
One interviewee presented a picture in which the Supervisory board exerts not only pol-
icy control, but also control over minor decisions. This is as much lamented as accepted, 
given the public ownership of the Charité.  As far as the scope of the government’s in-
tervention is concerned, this may turn to be as pervasive as to question the hospital’s 
purchase of diagnostic equipment or inquiring about the number of employees in spe-
cific outsourced companies. The Land administration also regulates the volume of ser-
vice provided and is heavily involved in the negotiation with sickness funds. What is 
                                                                                                                                               
sation of Charité was enacted in 2004, some concerns emerged about the dual leadership problem, but it remained 
unresolved.  
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most resented by the management team, as one interviewee suggested, is the scarce 
freedom in acquiring new companies and investment planning.  
Although political accountability remains firmly entrenched in the governance struc-
ture of the Charité, and fundamentally unchallenged by the transformation of the hospi-
tal administration from a bureaucratic to an entrepreneurial rationality, this is not to say 
that political control extends to the patronage practices found in the French or Italian 
cases, where members of the supervisory boards have a say in the appointment of heads 
of hospitals´ departments (Mattei, 2006). The heads of departments at Charité are ap-
pointed by the faculty and do not suffer from political interference, as suggested by in-
terviews. They enjoy a contract similar to public servants and the newly appointed 
heads of department have been exposed to an element of performance related pay. This 
is a small minority of less than one per cent of all physicians. On the contrary, junior 
doctors do not have a performance element built in their employment contracts. Inter-
views suggest that the new system of performance related pay is not used as an incen-
tive to monitor performance and results, but rather as a mechanism of conferring finan-
cial privileges to the senior physicians. This is also confirmed by a weak and unclear 
system of developing performance indicators.  
CONCLUSIONS: A NEW CHALLENGE FROM WITHIN 
Towards the end of the 1970s and with greater intensity from the mid-1980s, many de-
veloped countries under the pressure of budget deficits began to develop new thinking 
on the public sector and its management. Beginning in the Anglo-Saxon world, a radical 
process of government transformation has spread out to other countries, including those 
with different administrative cultures and traditions, like Germany, France and Italy. 
Among politicians, practitioners and researchers of public administration it has acquired 
the general identity known loosely as New Public Management. The need for a new 
approach to public administration derived from the economic imperative to reduce the 
public deficit. Fiscal crises, in particular, have triggered the process of administrative 
reform in the public sector. 
Reducing the public deficit by retrenchment has proved a difficult task in many 
countries, because an important component of the political legitimacy of the govern-
ment lies in its support for social welfare programmes. In order to retain public confi-
dence and electoral support, therefore, national governments have sought to secure im-
proved efficiency of welfare services as an alternative to expenditure increases, or to 
offset the effects of cuts. When discussing the impact of NPM and its scope, as this pa-
per has suggested, one has to keep in mind the political purposes behind ostensibly 
technical and administrative measures. For instance, in the case of New Labour and 
educational reforms, re-branding activities illustrate the centrality of symbolic policy-
making.  
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The comparative study of education and health care has shown autonomisation and 
decentralisation to be key common elements in Britain, Germany, France and Italy. 
NPM claims that, to make the public sector more efficient, flexible and motivated, this 
requires the decentralisation of decision-making and the granting of operational inde-
pendence to local units of delivery. This claim assumes that a faraway central agency or 
department is less likely to give customers the services they want than a local agency, 
‘owned’ by the community, and thus able to know and serve their needs better. Decen-
tralisation is thus closely linked to the principle of community empowerment and de-
mocratic experimentalism (Sabel and Dorf, 1998). The danger of the NPM prescription 
in relation to this, however, lies in the assumption that ‘local’ always works better than 
‘central’, for inefficiency can in fact be reproduced at the subnational level of govern-
ment.   
Therefore, empirical findings suggest that organisational reforms of the welfare de-
livery state are marked by a high degree of cross-sectoral fertilisation beyond national 
borders, more so in the hospital sector than secondary schooling. The reforms analysed 
in this paper illustrate how similar organisational models, associated with managerial-
ism (Pollitt et al, 1998; Clarke et al, 1994) have challenged the old institutional settle-
ment of the welfare State differently in Britain, Germany, France and Italy, but similarly 
across sectors. Hence, convergence in the management of social policy is driven 
through cross-sectoral policy hybridisation. This resembles a delta type of convergence 
(Holzinger and Knill, 2005), by which the direction of change is similar across units, 
although the difference between countries may remain the same.   
The German Länder have had considerable centralised control over secondary 
schooling, as this paper suggests. However, at the end of the 1990s recent reforms have 
opened up the possibility to grant individual schools some autonomy over their teaching 
programs. This has been only partially the result of the PISA shock. These reforms were 
launched originally as part of the public intervention in streamlining the German admin-
istrative system. They formed part of the bottom-up driven Neue Steuerungsmodell, or 
New Steering Model. In selected Länder, including North Rhine Westphalia, Bremen 
and Hessen, pilot projects and experimentations have introduced some degree of struc-
tural autonomy by encouraging individual schools to design self-evaluation mechanisms 
and processes.  
In contrast to the case of schooling, the health care sector in Germany has been sub-
ject to transformative changes and potential new developments concerning the man-
agement processes of individual hospitals, as in the case of public hospitals in Berlin 
and Hamburg. One of the most significant findings is that the autonomy of German pub-
lic hospitals remains compatible with traditional political and institutional mechanisms, 
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suggesting that a zero sum game between managerial autonomy and old political institu-
tions is not the only recipe for the new forms of welfare delivery.  
In the case of Britain, the cross-sectoral outcome is quite reversed, despite the British 
government’s attempt to grant more autonomy to Foundation Hospitals. British state 
schools enjoy a high degree of autonomy from local authorities. Devolved budgets and 
flexibility represent an exclusive responsibility of many public schools, which are en-
couraged to become even more independent, according to the most recent 2005 White 
Paper.  Foundation Hospitals have been created by the same underpinning philosophy of 
decentralised management and local ownership. Despite the different points of depar-
ture for the hospital sector reforms in Germany and Britain, evidence suggests a degree 
of convergence with respect to their internal management changes.  
The diffusion of organisational models travels beyond national boundaries and wel-
fare regimes, making the organisational settlement of welfare delivery in different coun-
tries converge. Policy makers are becoming increasingly locked in the process of insti-
tutional isomorphism, which is the major driver of homogenisation of welfare arrange-
ments, as far as organisational fields are concerned, like schooling or the hospital sector. 
The converging process of organisational homogenisation affects equally welfare insti-
tutions in Germany, Britain, France and Italy. This process has started in the 1980s in 
Britain and is more consistent over time than other changes, including the development 
of market type mechanisms, which has unfolded in a stop and go fashion. Managerial-
ism, on the contrary, has been an impressively resilient reform pattern, expanding into 
areas which were originally not affected, such as social policy.  
Organisational convergence enhances the emergence of a dominant organisational 
model, namely a welfare delivery state normatively sanctioned by its adherence to 
autonomy and the enterprise formula. Even more striking than the visible empirical 
phenomenon of homogenisation is its rationality and major drivers, for here lies the po-
tential challenge to the welfare state, as conceptualised in the TRUDI constellation. If 
the empirical link between autonomy and performance is inconclusive, why would pol-
icy makers adopt, at an early or later stage, this model so ubiquitously and with such 
vivid commitment, as to trigger even fierce resistance and internal organisational con-
flicts with the professionals? One could argue that it is a risk-shifting devise for devolv-
ing financial losses to agencies, or delegation to networks in order to be able to cope 
with increasingly complex environments. These theories, however, do not explain ade-
quately why organisations are conforming precisely to these models of structural auton-
omy and the self-governing enterprise. 
Reshaping and restructuring the State of welfare is a highly visible endeavour, which 
offers legitimation to governments. Attending to the appearance of sustaining ‘innova-
tive’, ‘efficient’, and ‘modern’ institutions is certainly not a new instrument of produc-
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ing political legitimacy. Policy fashions have always existed. Notwithstanding, what is 
new and worth of greater research attention is that decreasing variance between coun-
tries and welfare regimes does not only pertain to policy fads or symbolic politics, but 
also to real changes to old organisational solutions. This originates new patterns of rela-
tionships between actors and new internal conflicts of the system of service delivery. It 
would be empirically inadequate to reduce changes of public management in social pol-
icy to a convergent rhetoric. This is an important element of legitimation, but the phe-
nomenon here observed goes beyond symbolism and extends to institutional change. 
Unless we appreciate the institutional and transformative changes affecting welfare 
service delivery in schools and hospitals in Germany, Britain, France and Italy, taking 
the argument beyond a value-laden debate of the odds of managerialism in social policy, 
the understanding of the back-door challenge to the welfare state remains elusive. Eco-
nomic efficiency and performance goals, presented as the apolitical, technical, and ines-
capable solutions to financial constraints and scarcity of resources, mask the political 
need for alternative instruments of legitimation for the State. Such an argument should 
not, though, lead us to ascertain that political action stops at the symbolic level. Under 
some circumstances, it does clearly not, as this paper has established. What is most im-
portant than debating about the discrepancy between political words and deeds, is the 
consequences for the welfare delivery state of such massive intrusion of new public 
management ideas. Distributional political conflicts are being displaced to increasingly 
technical and apolitical arenas, legitimated by the process of autonomisation. Managers 
are located in a pivotal role and politicians are increasingly separated from service de-
livery, as the case of France and Italy indicated. A new challenge is in sight for the 
European welfare state, a challenge that comes from within its own institutional devel-
opment, driven by homogenisation toward a new organisational settlement, dictated by 
‘autonomy’. 
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